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Smart grid has emerged as the next-generation electricity grid with power flow optimization and high power quality. Smart grid
technologies have attracted the attention of industry and academia in the last few years. However, the tradeoff between security and
efficiency remains a challenge in the practical deployment of the smart grid. Most recently, Li et al. proposed a lightweight message
authentication scheme with user anonymity and claimed that their scheme is provably secure. But we found that their scheme
fails to achieve mutual authentication and mitigate some typical attacks (e.g., impersonation attack, denial of service attack) in the
smart grid environment. To address these drawbacks, we present a newmessage authentication scheme with reasonable efficiency.
Security and performance analysis results show that the proposed scheme can satisfy the security and lightweight requirements of
practical implementations and deployments of the smart grid.
1. Introduction
The explosive growth in mobile data services has paved the
way for wireless communications to be achieved with lower
energy consumption, higher throughout, and better quality
of service [1]. The smart grid is one of the most significant
technologies for developing smart homes and, as a result,
we have witnessed an increase in interest among researchers
and engineers in these technologies. Besides the one-way
information flow communication as in the traditional power
grid, the smart grid incorporates two-way communications
to provide reliability, efficiency, and security for the electric
system, where there are many machines (i.e., smart meters,
sensing devices, control systems, and other household appli-
cations) involved to enable these two-way communications
[2, 3].
Generally, network communication forms the core of the
electric system automation applications of the smart grid.
The deployment of one-way information flow communi-
cation networks is similar to that in the traditional smart
grid. As for the two-way information flow communication
network, it involves a neighborhood gateway which collects
the electricity consumption records from corresponding
consumers via wireless network connections [4]. Next, the
neighborhood gateway sends its collected data to the control
center for detailed consumption analysis via a wired network
connection. Finally, the control center responds with real-
time pricing information to the smart grid consumers or
sends the electric control information to relieve the burden
of electricity demand peak. At the consumer’s side, the
device communicating with the neighborhood gateway is the
smart meter which is resource-constrained and is responsible
for collecting the electricity consumption reports through
its connection with various household appliances. Figure 1
depicts the communication architecture for smart grid (and
the entities concluded in a home area network (HAN) are
some household appliances).
To enable network communications in the above archi-
tecture, it is desirable to choose the Internet Protocol-based
communication technologies for the smart grid. Inevitably,
such networks are prone to a number of external attacks,
such as impersonation attack, tracking attack, and denied
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Figure 1: Simplified communication architecture of smart grid (updated from [4]).
of service (DoS) attack [6]. Additionally, a large volume of
sensitive data that directly impact user privacy is transmitted
over these networks. Consequently, it is crucial to ensure that
unauthorized entities cannot access such transmitted infor-
mation or communicate with the information technologies
elements in the smart grid communication systems.
Authentication and key agreement protocols are key
technologies that can ensure the security of an information
system. Together, they ensure the legitimacy and authenticity
of a user’s identity and provide an agreed session key
for secure communication between entities in a network.
According to recent researches [7–10], several authentication
schemes for smart grid were proposed over the last several
years. We identify two major limitations of many of these
recently proposed authentications for smart grid:
(i)The computation cost of these schemes is not practical
for smart grid environment:
in a smart grid, most of smart things and applications
connected to the Internet are constrained to compu-
tation capabilities. However, the smart devices (e.g.,
smart meters) in these authentication schemes are
expected to perform some compute-intensive oper-
ations, such as the map-to-point hash and bilinear
pairing operations.
(ii) Important security properties or functions are not
provided by these schemes:
these schemes have various vulnerabilities that can
be exploited in different types of attacks to the smart
grid networks, such as the impersonation attack and
denial of service attack. Someof these schemes cannot
provide securemutual authentication, key agreement,
and user anonymity. These limitations seriously hin-
der their practical deployment and implementation in
the smart grid environment.
Most recently, Li et al. [5] proposed an anonymous
and lightweight message authentication scheme for smart
grids. They only used some very lightweight cryptographic
operations in their scheme, e.g., bitwise XOR operation and
one-way hash functions. They also claimed that their scheme
is provably secure and provides many necessary functions
and security properties. However, we demonstrate that their
scheme cannot provide secure mutual authentication and
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resistance against DoS attacks, which can seriously affect the
availability of network communication systems. Since the
message transmitted over the grid communication networks
is delay-sensitive, these networks of smart grids are much
more focused on the message delay than the data throughout
when compared with the general Internet. Thus, Li et al.’s
scheme is not practical in the deployment of smart grids.
To address these weaknesses, we then propose an improved
scheme and show that it is provably secure in Section 6.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
the next two sections, we briefly review related works and
relevant preliminaries, respectively. In Section 4, we review
Li et al.’s scheme and identify the design weaknesses of their
scheme. In Section 5, we describe our improved message
authentication scheme for the smart grid. In Sections 6 and
7, we analyze the security and evaluate the performance of
our proposed scheme respectively. Finally, we make some
concluding remarks in the last section.
2. Related Work
In the last decade, several cryptographic protocols including
digital signature [11], encryption [12, 13], data aggregation [14,
15], secure data storage [16–18], and authentication schemes
[9, 19] have been proposed as solutions to secure the smart
grid by academia and industry [20]. The authentication
scheme is the first line of defense to protect data security
and enforce privacy protection for smart grids, and it is an
important requirement in the deployment of smart grids.
Tsai and Lo [8] proposed an anonymous key distribution
scheme to provide secure communications for smart grids
by integrating identity-based signature and identity-based
encryption. In their scheme, it is fairly easy for smart
meters to authenticate each other, while some bilinear pairing
operations are introduced. Later, Odelu et al. [21] pointed
out that Tsai and Lo’s scheme fails to support SK-security
and credential privacy of smart meters and then proposed a
new authentication key agreement scheme for the smart grid
environment to solve the vulnerabilities in [8].
Chim et al. proposed a gateway-assisted authentication
for power usage information with privacy preservation for
smart grids, which allowed the smart meters to aggregate
power usage information [22]. Chan and Zhou proposed
a two-factor cyberphysical device authentication scheme
to resist coordinated cyberphysical attacks in a smart grid
(SG) environment by combining a novel contextual factor
and conventional authentication factor [23]. Then, Wazid
et al. proposed a secure three-factor authentication scheme
for renewable-energy-based smart grid environment, which
can provide password and biometric update and smart
meter anonymity [19]. Li et al. [24] also proposed a three-
factor authentication scheme for smart grid and solved the
shortcomings (i.e., wrong password detection mechanism,
vulnerability in DoS attacks) in [25].
Li et al. claimed that many of the existing authentication
schemes for wireless sensor networks more or less suffer
from various weaknesses, so that they proposed a new secure
authentication scheme with privacy preservation based on
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for industrial Internet of
things [26]. Mahmood et al. also proposed an ECC-based
privacy-preserving authentication for smart grid commu-
nications with high efficiency by reducing some complex
cryptographic operations [27]. Koo et al. also investigated
both security and privacy into smart grid systems; they
proposed a provably secure scheme with privacy-preserving
aggregation and multisource smart meters authentication
[28]. Before this, He et al. had proposed two related data
aggregation schemes that are resistant against insider attacks
in smart grid systems [14, 29].
Shen et al. designed two lightweight authentication pro-
tocols and a group key establishment algorithm between
sensor nodes and personal digital assistants for wireless
body area networks [30, 31]. Their proposed protocols were
aimed at resource-constrained devices and therefore they can
be applied to smart grid systems. Ennahbaoui and Idrissi
[32] designed a zero-knowledge authentication and intrusion
detection system for secure smart grids. In [33], Aujla et
al. argued that traditional TCP/IP-based networks are not
suitable for most smart applications, so they proposed an
SDN-enabled multiattribute secure communication model
for smart grids.Most recently, Li et al. [5] proposed a provably
secure message authentication scheme with high efficiency
for smart grids. However, in this work, we will demonstrate
the scheme fails to provide mutual authentication and cannot
mitigate the impersonation attacks and DoS attacks.
2.1. Our Contributions. In this subsection, we summarize the
main contributions of this work as follows:
(i) First, we propose a new anonymous message authen-
tication scheme for smart grid. The proposed scheme
addresses the weaknesses in Li et al.’s scheme with
desire efficiency.
(ii) Second, we make an in-depth security analysis to
demonstrate out proposed scheme is provably secure
and can fulfill those security requirements of the
smart grid environment.
(iii) Finally, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
scheme and compare it with that in Li et al.’s scheme.
The comparison results show that our scheme is more
suitable for the practical deployment of the smart
grid.
3. Preliminaries
Next, we present the threat models, some notations, and two
mathematical problems used in this paper.
3.1. Notations. We use the following notations in this paper:
(i) 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 : the 𝑖-th smart meter gateway of the home
area network (HAN).
(ii) 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 : the 𝑗-th smart meter gateway of the neigh-
borhood area network (NAN).
(iii) G: a cyclic multiplication group.
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(iv) 𝑞: a strong prime integer as the order of G.
(v) 𝑔: the generator of G.
(vi) ℎ: the secure hash function, where ℎ : {0, 1}∗ 󳨀→ 𝑍𝑞.
(vii) ℎ󸀠: the secure hash function, where ℎ󸀠 : {0, 1}∗ 󳨀→
{0, 1}log2𝑞+|𝐼𝐷|.
(viii) 𝐼𝐷𝑖: the real identity of𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 , where 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
(ix) 𝐼𝐷𝑗: the real identity of𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 , where 𝐼𝐷𝑗 ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
(x) ⊕: the exclusive-OR operation.
(xi) Δ𝑡: the uplimited time interval.
(xii) 𝑃𝑟[𝐸]: the probability of event 𝐸.
3.2. Mathematical Problems. Let G be a cyclic multiplication
group with generator 𝑔 and a strong prime integer 𝑞 as its
order, so that 𝑝 = 2 × 𝑞 + 1 is also a large prime integer. For
any number 𝑎 ∈ 𝑍∗𝑞 , 𝑔𝑎 mod 𝑝 is included in G. For clarity,
we omit the expression “mod p” in this paper. The following
twomathematical problems are the security foundation of the
proposed scheme in Section 5.
(1) Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem.Given two elements
(𝑔, 𝑔𝑎) ∈ G, the goal is to compute the value of 𝑎 ∈
𝑍∗𝑞 , which is hard for a polynomial function with in
polynomial time.
(2) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem.Given
three elements (𝑔, 𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏) ∈ G, where 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑍∗𝑞
are kept secret, the goal is to compute the value of
𝑔𝑎𝑏 ∈ G, which is hard for a polynomial function
within polynomial time.
3.3. Network Model. In our network model, we focus on the
communication security between the neighborhood gateway
and the smart meter. As shown in Figure 2, we assume that a
neighborhood area network (NAN) covers a number of home
area networks (HANs, e.g.,𝐻𝐴𝑁1, 𝐻𝐴𝑁2,𝐻𝐴𝑁3), where the
smart meter is a communication center. We also assume the
smart meter as a gateway in the HAN.
(i) Registration center (RC): the RC represents a trusted
third party that is responsible for generating all
system parameter, and secret values (i.e., private key)
for each communication party in the system.
(ii) Neighborhood gateway (NAN-GW): the NAN-GW
represents a gateway deployed in the NAN. It is in
charge of receiving the consumption reports from
each HAN-GW and then sends them to the control
center.Themain function of theNAN-GW is to detect
the replay attack, impersonation attack, and other
malicious attacks.
(iii) Home gateway (HAN-GW): theHAN-GWrepresents
a gateway deployed in the HAH. It is equipped with
a smart meter in order to collect the consumption
reports and then transmits them to theNAN-GW.The
HAN-GW is resource-constrained and vulnerable to
many network attacks.
4. Cryptanalysis of Li et al.’s Scheme
In this section, we briefly review the provably secure message
authentication scheme proposed by Li et al. For more details,
readers can refer to [5]. Focusing on the authentication
phase, we demonstrate that this phase is vulnerable to the
impersonation attack and the DoS attack.
4.1. Review of Li et al.’s Scheme. Li et al.’s scheme consists of
three phases (i.e., initialization phase, authentication phase,
and message transmission phase) and two communication
parties (i.e., 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗). Since the initialization
phase and message transmission phase are the same as
described in Sections 5.1 and 5.3, we omit them in this
subsection. We only present the authentication phase as
depicted in Figure 3.
Step A1. 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 randomly selects a number 𝑎 ∈ 𝑍
∗
𝑞 and
extracts the current timestamp 𝑡𝑖 to compute 𝐶1 = 𝑔𝑎, 𝐶2 =
𝑃𝑠𝑗 ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 and 𝐶3 = 𝑎(𝑥𝑖 + ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑖))−1.
Step A2.𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 sends𝑀1 = {𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝑡𝑖} to𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 .
Step A3. Upon receiving message 𝑀1, 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 extracts the
current timestamp 𝑡󸀠𝑖 , checking whether |𝑡󸀠𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖| ≤ Δ𝑡 holds.
If so, it continues to compute 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐶2 ⊕ 𝐶
𝑦𝑗
1 for verifying
𝑃𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡𝑖))𝐶3
?= 𝐶1. If the equation does not hold, it aborts
the current authentication. Otherwise, it does the next step.
Step A4. 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 randomly selects a number 𝑏 ∈ 𝑍
∗
𝑞 and
extracts the current timestamp 𝑡𝑗 to compute 𝐶4 = 𝑔𝑏, 𝐶5 =
ℎ(𝐶𝑦𝑗1 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑖) ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑗, 𝑠𝑘𝑁−𝐻 = ℎ(𝐶1 ‖ 𝐶4 ‖ 𝐶𝑏1 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗)
and 𝐶6 = ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗 ‖ 𝑡𝑗 ‖ 𝐶1 ‖ 𝐶4 ‖ 𝑠𝑘𝑁−𝐻).
Step A5.𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 sends𝑀2 = {𝐶4, 𝐶5, 𝐶6, 𝑡𝑖} to𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 .
Step A6. Upon receiving message 𝑀2, 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 extracts the
current timestamp 𝑡󸀠𝑗, checking whether |𝑡󸀠𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗| ≤ Δ𝑡 holds.
If it holds, it computes 𝐼𝐷𝑗 = 𝐶5 ⊕ ℎ(𝑃𝑎𝑗 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑗),
𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁 = ℎ(𝐶1 ‖ 𝐶4 ‖ 𝐶𝑎4 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗). Then, it
checks the correctness of 𝐶6 = ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗 ‖
𝑡𝑗 ‖ 𝐶1 ‖ 𝐶4 ‖ 𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁) to determine whether aborts this
communication.
4.2. Design Weaknesses in Li et al.’s Scheme. With superior
performance and desired properties over the relatedworks, Li
et al.’s scheme seems quite promising from the perspective of
desirable features which their scheme supports. However, its
potential threats in some realistic attack scenarios go beyond
the provable security model, the security analysis of their
scheme is insufficient. We will show that their scheme fails to
achieve mutual authentication by verifying (𝑃𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡𝑖))𝐶3 =
𝐶1 at the 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 ’s side. Additionally, their scheme cannot
resist impersonation attack where an attacker A forges a
message𝑀1 to impersonate𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 .
Security and Communication Networks 5
NAN-GW
Example in HAN 3
RC
HAN 2
HAN 3
HAN 1
NAN-GW
RC: Registration Center
NAN-GW: the Gateway in Neighborhood Area Network
HAN: Home Area Network
Figure 2: A simplified communication network model (updated from [1]).
Figure 3: Authentication phase of Li et al.’s scheme.
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Next we investigate the following new but realistic attack-
ing scenario. Suppose the identity 𝐼𝐷𝑖 is somehow known to
an attackerA as in the case whenA is familiar to the user and
guesses the 𝐼𝐷𝑖 via the user’s personal information. Since the
authentication message 𝑀1 = {𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝑡𝑖} is transmitted
over an open channel, it is easy forA to intercept𝑀1 during
any authentication process. Suppose A has obtained two
messages 𝑀11 = {𝐶11, 𝐶12, 𝐶13, 𝑡1𝑖 } and 𝑀21 = {𝐶21, 𝐶22, 𝐶23, 𝑡2𝑖 },
where 𝐶11 = 𝑔𝑎1 , 𝐶21 = 𝑔𝑎2 and 𝑎1, 𝑎2 are unknown to the
attacker. A can impersonate𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 by forging any request
message𝑀∗1 = {𝐶∗1 , 𝐶∗2 , 𝐶∗3 , 𝑡∗𝑖 }with real-time 𝑡∗𝑖 as shown by
following steps.
Step 1. Compute ℎ1 = ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡1𝑖 ), ℎ2 = ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡2𝑖 ), ℎ∗ =
ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡∗𝑖 ), and 𝑃1 = 𝐶12 ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖, 𝑃2 = 𝐶22 ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖.
Step 2. Select two variables 𝜎1, 𝜎2 to construct equations
𝐶∗3 = 𝜎1 ⋅ 𝐶13 + 𝜎2 ⋅ 𝐶23
ℎ∗ ⋅ 𝐶∗3 = 𝜎1 ⋅ ℎ1 ⋅ 𝐶13 + 𝜎2 ⋅ ℎ2 ⋅ 𝐶23
(1)
Step 3. Compute one of solutions to above equations, such as
𝜎1 = 1
𝜎2 =
(ℎ∗ − ℎ1) 𝐶13
(ℎ2 − ℎ∗) 𝐶23
(2)
Step 4. Compute 𝐶∗1 = (𝐶11)𝜎1 ⋅ (𝐶21)𝜎2 , 𝐶∗2 = ((𝑃1)𝜎1 ⋅ (𝑃2)𝜎2 ) ⊕
𝐼𝐷𝑖, and 𝐶∗3 = 𝜎1 ⋅ 𝐶13 + 𝜎2 ⋅ 𝐶23.
Step 5. Send𝑀∗1 = {𝐶∗1 , 𝐶∗2 , 𝐶∗3 , 𝑡∗𝑖 } to a valid𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 .
Correctness. Upon receiving the message 𝑀∗1 from A,
𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 first checks the freshness of 𝑡
∗
𝑖 . Then, it computes
𝐼𝐷∗𝑖 = 𝐶∗2 ⊕ (𝐶∗1 )𝑦𝑗 . Since
𝐶∗2 = ((𝑃1)
𝜎1 ⋅ (𝑃2)𝜎2) ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖
= ((𝑃𝑎1𝑗 )
𝜎1 ⋅ (𝑃𝑎2𝑗 )
𝜎2) ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖
= ((𝑔𝑎1𝜎1)𝑦𝑗 ⋅ (𝑔𝑎2𝜎2)𝑦𝑗) ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖
= ((𝐶11)
𝜎1 ⋅ (𝐶21)
𝜎2)
𝑦𝑗 ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = (𝐶∗1 )
𝑦𝑗 ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖
(3)
we obtain 𝐼𝐷∗𝑖 = 𝐶∗2 ⊕ (𝐶∗1 )𝑦𝑗 = 𝐼𝐷𝑖. Next, 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 checks
whether (𝑃𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡
∗
𝑖 ))𝐶∗3 ?= 𝐶∗1 . According to Step 2 above, we
can get
(𝑃𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡
∗
𝑖 ))
𝐶∗3 = 𝑃𝐶
∗
3
𝑖 ⋅ 𝑔ℎ
∗𝐶∗3
= 𝑃𝜎1𝐶
1
3+𝜎2𝐶
2
3
𝑖 ⋅ 𝑔𝜎1ℎ1𝐶
1
3+𝜎2ℎ2𝐶
2
3
= (𝑃𝐶
1
3
𝑖 ⋅ 𝑔ℎ1𝐶
1
3)
𝜎1 ⋅ (𝑃𝐶
2
3
𝑖 ⋅ 𝑔ℎ1𝐶
2
3)
𝜎2
= (𝐶11)
𝜎1 ⋅ (𝐶21)
𝜎2 = 𝐶∗1
(4)
Therefore, an attacker A can pass 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 ’s authen-
tication without knowing a 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ’s private key. As a
result, A manages to make 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 believe that he/she is
a valid 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and continuously execute authentication
operations. Thus, an external attacker can break the security
of mutual authentication and launch the DoS attack on the
smart grid by impersonating a legal 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 gateway to
connect with the corresponding𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 . As a consequence,
the smart grid network system cannot reject the connection
of a malicious IP address by detecting the invalid data
packages received, and thus it is susceptible to DoS attacks,
which will lead to an increase in message delay.
Effectiveness. It is worth noting that the above attack is very
effective because it only requires a passive eavesdropping
attacker and involves a few lightweight cryptographic oper-
ations, such as addition, multiplication, exponentiation, and
hash operations. For example, to get a solution in Step 3 and
forge a successful authenticationmessage𝑀1 , we only require
three general hash operations, six multiplication operations,
one division operation, four exponentiation operations, and
three addition/subtraction operations. Given the running
time of each operation referred in Li et al.’s scheme [5], the
total time forA to successfully implement an attack is about
1.396ms.
5. The Proposed Scheme
To overcome the weakness of Li et al.’s scheme, we propose an
improved anonymous message authentication scheme for the
smart grid. Similar to Li et al.’s scheme, our protocol also has
three phases: the initialization phase, the authentication and
key agreement phase, and the message transmission phase.
5.1. Initialization Phase. In this phase, the registration center
(RC) generates the system parameters and private-public key
pair for each registered entity (i.e.,𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗) as
follows.
Step I1. The RC chooses a multiplication cyclic group G with
order 𝑞, and the generator is 𝑔. Next, the RC selects a secure
one-way hash function ℎ󸀠(⋅) : {0, 1}∗ 󳨀→ {0, 1}log2𝑞+|𝐼𝐷| and a
secure hash function ℎ(⋅) : {0, 1}∗ 󳨀→ 𝑍∗𝑞 .
Step I2. For each registered entity, RC generates a distinct
random number 𝑥 as private key and computes 𝑔𝑥 as the
corresponding public key. Here, let 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑍∗𝑞 be the 𝑖-th HAN-
GW’s private key, and 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑔𝑥𝑖 be 𝑖-th HAN-GW’s public key.
Step I3.The RC sends the key pair (𝑥𝑖, 𝑃𝑖) to𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 (i.e., the𝑖-thHAN-GW) via a secure channel, where𝑃𝑖 can be revealed
to others.
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Figure 4: Authentication phase of the proposed scheme.
Similarly, the 𝑗-th NAN-GW can obtain its own key pair
as (𝑦𝑗, 𝑄𝑗 = 𝑔𝑦𝑗 ) from the RC as described in Step I3.
5.2. Authentication Phase. In this phase, 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 authenticate with each other. In addition, a tem-
porary session key is created and used for encrypting sub-
sequent transmitted messages. As depicted in Figure 4, the
details are described as follows.
Step A1. 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 first chooses a random number 𝑎 from
group 𝑍∗𝑞 and assigns up the current timestamp 𝑡𝑖. Then,
𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 computes 𝐴 = 𝑔
𝑎, 𝐶 = 𝑄𝑎𝑗 ⊕ (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑆) and 𝑆 =
𝑎 − 𝑥𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑖 ‖ 𝐴).
Step A2.𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 sends the plain message𝑀1 = (𝐴, 𝐶, 𝑡𝑖) to𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 via a public channel.
Step A3. Upon receiving message 𝑀1 at time 𝑡󸀠𝑖 , 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗
first checks the freshness of the timestamp 𝑡𝑖 by equation
|𝑡󸀠𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖| ≤ Δ𝑡. If it holds, 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 computes 𝐼𝐷
󸀠
𝑖 = 𝐶 ⊕ 𝐴𝑦𝑗
and further verifies the correctness of 𝐴 ?= 𝑔𝑆 ⋅ 𝑃ℎ(𝐼𝐷󸀠‖𝑡𝑖‖𝐴)𝑖 .
If the final equation does not hold, 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 aborts the
authentication process. Otherwise, it continues to the next
step.
Step A4. 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 selects a random number 𝑏 from group
𝑍∗𝑞 and gets the current timestamp 𝑡𝑗. Similarly, 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖
computes 𝐵 = 𝑔𝑏 and the temporary session key 𝑠𝑘𝑁−𝐻 =
ℎ(𝐴 ‖ 𝐵 ‖ 𝐴𝑏 ‖ 𝐼𝐷󸀠𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗. Finally, 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 computes
V = ℎ(𝐼𝐷󸀠𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗, 𝑠𝑘𝑁−𝐻), 𝐷 = ℎ󸀠(𝐴𝑦𝑗 ‖ 𝐼𝐷󸀠𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑗) ⊕ (𝐼𝐷𝑗 ‖ V).
Here, we assume that𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 already knows the identity
of 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 (i.e., 𝐼𝐷𝑗) because it is a control smart meter
among several 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 in a specific neighborhood.
Step A5.𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 sends the plain message𝑀2 = (𝐵,𝐷, 𝑡𝑗) to
𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 via a public channel.
Step A6. Upon receiving message 𝑀2, 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 assigns the
current timestamp 𝑡󸀠𝑗 and checks |𝑡󸀠𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗| ≤ Δ𝑡. If it does
not hold, 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 aborts this authentication. Otherwise,
𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 first computes (𝐼𝐷
󸀠
𝑗 ‖ V󸀠) = ℎ󸀠(𝑄𝑎𝑗 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑗) ⊕
𝐷, 𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖ 𝐵 ‖ 𝐵𝑎 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷󸀠𝑗). Then 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖
verifies the correctness V󸀠 ?= ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷󸀠𝑗 ‖ 𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁). If it holds,
𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 confirms that the temporary session key 𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁 is
associated with 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 . Otherwise, 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 aborts this
authentication process.
5.3. Message Transmission Phase. In this phase, a secure
symmetric encryption algorithm (i.e., Advanced Encryption
Standard, AES) and a secure one-way hash function are used
to guarantee the message’s confidentiality and integrity. The
details are as follows.
Step M1. 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 periodically collects user’s current elec-
tricity consumption report 𝑀𝑖 and computes the value of
𝐻𝑖 = ℎ(𝑀𝑖 ‖ 𝑇𝑖), where 𝑇𝑖 is the current timestamp. Then,
𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 encrypts the message𝑀𝑖 as 𝐶𝑖 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑀𝑖 ‖ 𝑇𝑖 ‖ 𝐻𝑖)
by using the above agreed session key 𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁, and sends 𝐶𝑖 to
𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 over a public channel.
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Step M2. After receiving 𝐶𝑖 at time 𝑇󸀠𝑖 , 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 runs the
decryption algorithm 𝐷𝑒𝑐 to get the corresponding plaintext
of 𝐶𝑖 with session key 𝑠𝑘𝑁−𝐻. The plaintext is in the form of
𝑀𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑖 ‖ 𝐻𝑖. 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 further verifies |𝑇
󸀠
𝑖 − 𝑇𝑖| ≤ Δ𝑡 and
ℎ(𝑀𝑖 ‖ 𝑇𝑖)
?= 𝐻𝑖 to confirm the freshness and integrity of the
received message.
6. Security Analysis and Comparisons
In this section, we first apply the following security model to
prove that the proposed scheme is provably secure. Secondly,
we make a further discussion to demonstrate that it can
resist various well-known attacks along with the security
requirements for smart grid.
6.1. Security Model. We assume that there are two entities
𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 in a message authentication scheme
Π. Let 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝑙𝐺𝑊𝑖 and 𝑁𝐴𝑁
𝑙
𝐺𝑊𝑗
denote the 𝑙-th instance of
𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 respectively. If the two entities do not
need to be distinguished, we denote the 𝑙-th instance of them
as I𝑙. All of them can have multiple instances and they are
allowed to execute the scheme concurrently.
Definition 1 (adversary abilities). We use some oracles played
between an adversary A and a simulator C to prove the
security of the proposed scheme. A is able to know all the
public parameters of 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 and control the
network. Moreover,A can execute the following queries and
get corresponding answers as follows:
(i) ℎ(𝑚𝑡): C maintains a table 𝐿ℎ (or 𝐿ℎ󸀠) that is initial-
ized to empty. Upon receiving the query, C checks
if (𝑚𝑡, 𝑟𝑡) is recorded in 𝐿ℎ, if so, C returns 𝑟𝑖 to
A. Otherwise, C chooses a random number 𝑟𝑖 and
outputs it toA and then records the generated entry
(𝑚𝑖, 𝑟𝑖) into 𝐿ℎ (or 𝐿ℎ󸀠).
(ii) 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒(𝐻𝐴𝑁𝑙𝐺𝑊𝑖 , 𝑁𝐴𝑁
𝑙
𝐺𝑊𝑗
): this query simulates a
passive attack. C honestly performs the authentica-
tion scheme that allowsA to get access to the normal
authentication process and outputs 𝑀1,𝑀2 as the
answer.
(iii) 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑(I𝑙, 𝑚): A executes the query with message 𝑚
and C performs the message authentication scheme
according to its specification and then returns the
output result toA.
(iv) 𝑅𝑒V𝑒𝑎𝑙(I𝑙): if the oracle IL has turned into the
Accept state,A can get the current session key of this
oracle.
(v) 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡(I𝑙): this oracle is used in the forward
secrecy model, whereA can get the long-term secret
key ofI𝑙 fromC’s answer.
(vi) 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡(I𝑙): this oracle tests the AKA security of the
session key. As the 𝑙-th session, C selects a bit 𝑏 ∈
{0, 1}, if 𝑏 = 1, outputs the real session key as the
answer. Otherwise, C outputs a random string with
the same length as the real session key.
Definition 2 (AKA-secure). Let the probability thatA guesses
the bit 𝑏 involved in the Test query denote A’s advantage of
breaking the scheme.More precisely, we denote the advantage
as 𝑃𝑟[𝐴𝑑V𝑎𝑘𝑎Π (A)] = 2𝑃𝑟[𝑏 = 𝑏󸀠] − 1. We say a scheme
Π is AKA-secure if 𝑃𝑟[𝐴𝑑V𝑎𝑘𝑎Π (A)] is negligible for any
polynomial adversary A.
Definition 3 (MA-secure). We say a message authentication
scheme for smart grid Π is mutual authentication (MA)
secure if the probability 𝑃𝑟[𝐴𝑑V𝑚𝑎Π (A)] is negligible for any
polynomial adversary A.
6.2. Formal Security Proof. In this subsection, we show that
our improved scheme is provably secure for smart grid. Let
𝐸1 denote the event that A can break the authentication
of 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 -to- 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 and 𝐸2 denote the event that A
can break the authentication of 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 -to- 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 . Let
𝐸3 denote the event that A can break AKA security of the
improved message authentication scheme. Let 𝑃𝑟[𝐸1] = 𝜀1
and 𝑃𝑟[𝐸2] = 𝜀2 be the advantage of the events that A can
break the authentication of 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 to 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 and the
authentication of𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 to𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 , respectively.
Theorem 4. The proposed scheme for the smart grid is MA-
secure if both 𝑃𝑟[𝐸1] and 𝑃𝑟[𝐸2] are negligible.
Proof. Assume that the adversary has executed the above-
mentioned oracles in the normal manner. In particular, we
consider that A executes the 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑(𝑁𝐴𝑁𝑙𝐺𝑊𝑗 ,𝑀1)-query, if
the simulator succeeds to compute the value of 𝐴 = 𝑔𝑆 ⋅
𝑃ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡𝑖‖𝐴)𝑖 , it implies that the message𝑀1 = {𝐴, 𝐶, 𝑡𝑖} is valid.
If A can produce a valid 𝑀1, it can produce another valid
message𝑀󸀠1 = {𝐴, 𝐶󸀠, 𝑡󸀠𝑖 }, whichmeans it can generate a valid
𝑆󸀠. Then, C can get 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ’s private key 𝑥𝑖 = ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡
󸀠
𝑖 ‖
𝐴)/(𝑆 − 𝑆󸀠) due to the following equations
𝐴 = 𝑔𝑆 ⋅ 𝑃ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡𝑖‖𝐴)𝑖 (5)
and
𝐴 = 𝑔𝑆󸀠 ⋅ 𝑃ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡
󸀠
𝑖 ‖𝐴)
𝑖
(6)
Based the above two equations, we get
1 = 𝑔
𝑆 ⋅ 𝑃ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡𝑖‖𝐴)𝑖
𝑔𝑆󸀠 ⋅ 𝑃ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡
󸀠
𝑖 ‖𝐴)
𝑖
= 𝑔(𝑆+𝑥𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡𝑖‖𝐴))−(𝑆󸀠+𝑥𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡󸀠𝑖 ‖𝐴)) (7)
Thus, A can output 𝑥𝑖 = ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡󸀠𝑖 ‖ 𝐴)/(𝑆 − 𝑆󸀠) as
a solution of the DL problem. It is similar to [5] that the
probability of forging a correct pair (𝐴, 𝑆) is 1/𝑝𝑞. Therefore,
the probability that C can solve the DL problem is 𝜀1/𝑝𝑞,
which is contradicted with the hardness of DL problem. In
other words, the probability of 𝑃𝑟[𝐸1] = 𝜀1 is negligible.
Similarly, considering the query 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑(𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ,𝑀2), if
the message𝑀2 can pass the verification ofC, it implies that
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C can get a perfect hash recording including (𝑄𝑎𝑗 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑗)
in 𝐿ℎ󸀠 , where 𝑄𝑗 = 𝑔𝑦𝑗 . Therefore, C can output 𝑄𝑎𝑗 = 𝑔𝑦𝑗𝑎
as the instance (𝑔, 𝑔𝑦𝑗 , 𝑔𝑎) of the CDH problem with the
probability of 𝜀2/𝑞ℎ󸀠 , where 𝑞ℎ is the bound times of hash
queries. Since the CDH is hard, the probability 𝑃𝑟[𝐸2] = 𝜀2 is
negligible.
To conclude, the improved scheme is MA-secure.
Theorem5. Theproposed scheme for smart grid is AKA-secure
if 𝑃𝑟[𝐸3] is negligible.
Proof. Assume that an adversary A correctly guesses the
value of 𝑏 involved in the Test-query with a nonnegligible
probability 𝜀3. We then show that there exists a simulator C
that can solve the CDH problem.
Let𝐸𝑠𝑘 denote the event thatA obtains the correct session
key, and let 𝐸𝐻𝑏 , 𝐸𝑁𝑏 denote the events that A guesses 𝑏 in
instance 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and instance 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 respectively. From
the Definition 2, the probability that A guess the correct 𝑏 is
at least 1/2, and thus we can get 𝑃𝑟[𝐸𝑠𝑘] = 𝜀3/2. Furthermore,
we can get the following equations:
𝜀3
2 ≤ 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸𝑠𝑘]
= 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸𝑠𝑘⋀𝐸𝐻𝑏]
+ 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸𝑠𝑘⋀𝐸𝑁𝑏⋀𝐸1]
+ 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸𝑠𝑘⋀𝐸𝑁𝑏⋀
⌝𝐸1]
= 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸𝑠𝑘⋀𝐸𝐻𝑏] + 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸1]
+ 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸𝑠𝑘⋀𝐸𝑁𝑏⋀
⌝𝐸1]
𝜀3
2 − 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸1] ≤ 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸𝑠𝑘⋀𝐸𝐻𝑏]
+ 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸𝑠𝑘⋀𝐸𝑁𝑏⋀
⌝𝐸1]
≤ 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸𝑠𝑘⋀𝐸𝐻𝑏] + 𝑃𝑟 [𝐸𝑠𝑘⋀𝐸𝐻𝑏]
(8)
Thus, we get 𝑃𝑟[𝐸𝑠𝑘⋀𝐸𝐻𝑏 ] ≥ (1/2)(𝜀3/2 − 𝑃𝑟[𝐸1]).
According to Theorem 4, 𝑃𝑟[𝐸1] is negligible and, there-
fore, 𝑃𝑟[𝐸𝑠𝑘] is nonnegligible. Since A can break the AKA
security, A can output 𝑔𝑎𝑏 as the solution to the CDH
problem of instance (𝑔, 𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏) with nonnegligible probabil-
ity, which contradicts with the hardness of CDH problem.
Therefore, the proposed message authentication scheme for
smart grid is AKA-secure.
6.3. Other Discussions on Security Properties. We now dem-
onstrate how our improved scheme achieves the mutual
authentication, session key agreement, user anonymity, per-
fect forward secrecy, and resistance to several attacks [14, 34–
37].
Mutual Authentication. From the description of our proposed
scheme,𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 verifies the identity of𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 via check-
ing 𝐴 = 𝑔𝑆 ⋅ 𝑃ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖‖𝑡𝑖‖𝐴)𝑖 , and 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 verifies the identity of𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 via checking V = ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗 ‖ 𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁). The formal
security analysis has proved that nobody can impersonate one
of the two parties to cheat the other one by generating a valid
authenticated message𝑀1 (or𝑀2) during the authentication
process. Thus, our improved scheme can support mutual
authentication.
Session Key Agreement. In the authentication and key agree-
ment phase,𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 and𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 can independently com-
pute the session key 𝑠𝑘𝑁−𝐻 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖ 𝐵 ‖ 𝐴𝑏 ‖ 𝐼𝐷󸀠𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗)
and 𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖ 𝐵 ‖ 𝐵𝑎 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷󸀠𝑗), which can
be used to encrypt messages in subsequent communications.
Furthermore, 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 can verify the correctness of the
session key by recovering V (by computing 𝑄𝑎𝑗 ) and matching
it with its own computed ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗 ‖ 𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁). Thus, our
improved scheme can achieve session key agreement.
User Anonymity. In our improved scheme, the real identity of
𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 is hidden by 𝐶 = 𝑄
𝑎
𝑗 ⊕ 𝐼𝐷𝑖, where 𝑎 is a random
number chosen by 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and it is unknown to others.
So without knowing the value of 𝑎, the only way to reveal
the identity of 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 is to compute 𝐶 ⊕ 𝐴
𝑦𝑗 , where 𝐶 is
transmitted over the public channel while 𝑦𝑖 is the private key
known only to 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 . If the adversary intends to reveal
𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ’s real identity, the adversary needs to get the value
of 𝑄𝑎𝑗 or 𝐴𝑦𝑗 given 𝐴,𝑄𝑗, which means he/she has to solve
the CDH problem. Else, the adversary cannot get 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ’s
real identity. Thus, our improved scheme can provide user
anonymity.
Perfect Forward Secrecy.𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 agree with a
shared session key 𝑠𝑘 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖ 𝐵 ‖ 𝐴𝑏 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗) = ℎ(𝐴 ‖
𝐵 ‖ 𝐵𝑏 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑗) in the final step of the authentication and
key agreement phase. If an attacker intends to compute the
session key of a special communication, he/she has to obtain
the real identity of 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 and 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 and compute 𝑔
𝑎𝑏
from 𝐴 = 𝑔𝑎 and 𝐵 = 𝑔𝑏 as well. From the above analysis,
he/she needs to solve the CDH problem or it cannot derive
the correct session key even though he/she obtains long-term
secret key. Thus, our improved scheme can provide perfect
forward secrecy.
Resistance to Several Attacks. Next, we show how the
improved scheme can resist tracking attack, replay attacks,
impersonation attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and DoS
attack.
(i) Resistance of Tracking Attack. The messages transmitted
during each session phase are different and fresh as they are
randomized by two random numbers {𝑎, 𝑏}. This means an
attacker cannot link any two sessions to the same user or track
a user’s behaviors from some sessions. Thus, our improved
scheme can mitigate the tracking attack.
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Table 1: Running times of related operations (millisecond).
Operations 𝑇𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑛V 𝑇𝑚𝑚 𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑆 𝑇ℎ
Times 0.3308 0.0463 0.0038 0.0215 0.000033
(ii) Resistance to Replay Attack. As every authenticated mes-
sage (i.e.,𝑀1,𝑀2) contains timestamps, which also includes
in the computation of 𝑆 and 𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑗, an old/intercepted
authenticated messages cannot pass the verification of the
other party in the current time. Thus, our improved scheme
can mitigate the replay attack.
(iii) Resistance to Impersonation Attack. If an attacker intends
to impersonate 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 , he/she has to create a legal request
message𝑀1 that he/she needs to compute a valid 𝑆. It means
that he/she needs to know the private key 𝑥𝑖 of 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 .
Similarly, impersonating 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 should correctly compute
the value of ℎ󸀠(𝐴𝑦𝑗 ‖ 𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑗); otherwise, it cannot
pass the verification of 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 . If the attacker succeeds
to impersonate 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 , he/she either gets the private key
𝑦𝑗 or solves the CDH problem with the instance {𝑔, 𝐴 =
𝑔𝑎, 𝑄𝑗 = 𝑔𝑦𝑗 }. Thus, our improved scheme can mitigate the
impersonation attack.
(iv) Resistance to Mathematical Analytical Attack. We define
the attack onLi et al.’s protocol to be amathematical analytical
attack, and we now prove that our proposed protocol can
resist this attack. For the sake of fairness, we assume that
the identity 𝐼𝐷𝑖 is revealed to an attacker meaning that the
attacker can get the information of 𝐼𝐷𝑖 and many pairs of
(𝐴, 𝐶, 𝑡𝑖). From the structure of 𝐶 = 𝑄𝑎𝑗 ⊕ (𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑆),
the attacker cannot construct a system of linear equations
because it has no knowledge of 𝑆. Next, we compute 𝑆 =
𝑎 − 𝑥𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑖 ‖ 𝐴) rather than 𝑆 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝑖ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑖 ‖ 𝑡𝑖), which
further breaks the linear relations between equations. Thus,
our proposed protocol can resist the mathematical analytical
attack even if the attacker knows the user’s identity 𝐼𝐷𝑖.
(v) Resistance to Man-in-the-Middle Attack. As we analyzed
before, our improved scheme can provide mutual authenti-
cation, and no attacker is able to cheat 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖/𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗
through impersonating the other party. Thus, our improved
scheme can mitigate the man-in-the-middle attack.
(vi) Resistance of DoS Attack. Assuming that an attacker
intends to implement the DoS attack, he/she may flood the
𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 with some messages. If the message can pass the
verification of𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 , it will cause wastage of computation
and communication resources of 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 when computing
and transmitting the response message, which results in
increased delay for data communications in the smart grid.
In our improved scheme, an illegal message can be effectively
detected by𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 and thus aborts the current communi-
cation thereby avoiding additional unnecessary computation
and communication costs. Thus, our improved scheme can
provide resistance of DoS attack to some extent.
7. Performance Evaluation and Comparisons
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our improved
scheme and compare it with Li et al.’s scheme [5]. For fair
comparison, we use the experimental data referred in [5]
to evaluate the performance of Li et al.’s scheme and our
proposed scheme.
Here, we briefly recall the experimental platform and the
selected parameters used in Li et al.’s scheme. The executing
platform for running related cryptographic operations is a
personal computer with an Intel(R) Core TM i7-4710HQ
2.50GHz processor, 8GB memory, Win8 operating system.
The related operations (e.g.,modular exponentiation, bilinear
pairing operation) are executed based on the MIRACL
C/C++ library with Visual C++ 2010. To achieve the same
security level for different schemes, Li et al. chose a multi-
plication cyclic group consisting of 1024-bit integers.
Let AES and 160-bit SHA1 algorithms be the symmetric
encryption algorithm and hash function to handle messages
in the schemes. Note that each block in AES is 128 bits.
The following notations denote the average running times
of related cryptographic operations and the corresponding
results are presented in Table 1. Here, we ignore the XOR,
modular addition operations from the comparison because
their running times are negligible.
(i) 𝑇𝑚𝑒: The running time of a modular exponentiation
operation.
(ii) 𝑇𝑖𝑛V: The running time of a modular inversion opera-
tion.
(iii) 𝑇𝑚𝑚: The running time of a modular multiplication
operation.
(iv) 𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑆: The running time of a AES encryption/decryp-
tion operation.
(v) 𝑇ℎ: The running time of a SHA1 hash operation.
The authentication and key agreement phase of Li et al.’s
scheme [5] requires a total of three modular exponentiation
operations, one modular multiplication operation, one
modular inversion operation, and four SHA1 hash operations
at the𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ’s side to compute (𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝐼𝐷𝑗, 𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁, 𝐶6).
While at the 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 ’s side, it requires five modular
exponentiation operations, one modular multiplication
operation, and four SHA1 hash operations to calculate
(𝐼𝐷𝑖, 𝐶1, 𝐶4, 𝐶5, 𝐶6, 𝑠𝑘𝑁−𝐻). Therefore, Li et al.’s scheme
takes around 1.0426ms and 1.6579ms at 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ’s and𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 ’s sides respectively during the authentication and
key agreement phase.
In our proposed scheme, the authentication and key
agreement phase requires a total of three modular expo-
nentiation operations, onemodular multiplication operation,
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Table 2: Running operations of related operations (millisecond).
Our proposed scheme Scheme [5]
𝑇𝐻𝐴𝑁−𝐺𝑊 3𝑇𝑚𝑒 + 𝑇𝑚 + 4𝑇ℎ 3𝑇𝑚𝑒 + 𝑇𝑚 + 𝑇𝑖𝑛V + 4𝑇ℎ
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑁−𝐺𝑊 5𝑇𝑚𝑒 + 𝑇𝑚 + 4𝑇ℎ 5𝑇𝑚𝑒 + 𝑇𝑚 + 4𝑇ℎ
communication cost 3|𝐺| + 3|ℎ| + |ℎ󸀠| 3|𝐺| + 5|ℎ|
Table 3: Running times of related operations (millisecond).
𝑇𝐻𝐴𝑁−𝐺𝑊 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑁−𝐺𝑊 Communication cost
Our proposed scheme 0.9963 ms 1.6578 ms 3776 bits
Scheme [5] 1.0426 ms 1.6578 ms 3872 bits
and four SHA1 hash operations at the 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ’s side to
compute (𝐴, 𝐶, 𝑆, 𝑠𝑘𝐻−𝑁, V). While at the 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 ’s side,
it also requires five modular exponentiation operations,
one modular multiplication operation, and four SHA1 hash
operations to calculate (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐼𝐷󸀠𝑖 , 𝑆, 𝑠𝑘𝑁−𝐻, V).Therefore, this
phase only takes around 0.9963msand 1.6578msat𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ’s
and𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑗 ’s sides respectively.
For the communication cost, we need to transmit two
elements in the group G (i.e., 𝐴,𝐶) and only one element in
the group 𝑍∗𝑞 (i.e., 𝑡𝑖) at the 𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ’s side, and there is one
element in G (i.e., 𝐵), two elements in group 𝑍∗𝑞 (i.e., V, 𝑡𝑗)
to be transmitted at the 𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑊𝑖 ’s side. We assume that |𝐺|
denotes the length of element in group G and |ℎ|, |ℎ󸀠| denote
the length of element in group 𝑍∗𝑞 and (log2𝑞 + |𝐼𝐷|). Thus,
the total communication cost of our proposed scheme is
3|𝐺|+3|ℎ|+|ℎ󸀠| = 3776 bits (assume that the length of identity
is 64 bits). Similarly, we note that there are three elements
in G (i.e., 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶4) and five elements in the group 𝑍∗𝑞 (i.e.,
𝐶3, 𝐶5, 𝐶6, 𝑡𝑖, 𝑡𝑗) to be transmitted over the network channel.
Thus, the total communication cost of Li et a’.’s scheme is
3|𝐺| + 5|ℎ| = 3872 bits.
As shown in Tables 2 and 3, our proposed scheme
addresses the security weakness of the authentication phase
without increasing the computation and communication
costs when it is compared to [5]. In particular, the com-
putation cost at the HAN-GW’s side is even slightly lower
than that of [5] because the proposed protocol removes
the inversion operation. Therefore, our proposed protocol is
more suitable for the practical deployment of the smart grid.
8. Conclusion
Device authentication and secure message transmission are
important processes in the practical deployment of the smart
grid. Li et al. recently proposed a lightweight message authen-
tication scheme for the smart grid with user anonymity and
they claimed it is secure.However, we found that their scheme
fails to achieve device mutual authentication, which results in
possible network availability attacks that includeDoS attacks.
To address the weaknesses in Li et al.’s scheme, we proposed
an improved message authentication scheme which does not
incur additional computation and communication costs. A
security analysis demonstrates that our proposed scheme can
satisfy various security requirements for the smart grid. Our
future work will focus on reducing the communication cost
during the authentication process.
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